The notion of computability is developed through the study of the behavior of a set of languages interpreted over the natural numbers which contain their own fully defined satisfaction predicate and whose only other vocabulary is limited to 0, individual variables, the successor function, the identity relation and operators for disjunction, conjunction, and existential quantification.
Introduction
Techniques from recursion theory (the theory of computability) have proven to be invaluable in the study of the theory of truth. It is perhaps not as well known that recursion theory can in turn be studied in terms of the theory of truth (in particular the theory of satisfaction). I suspect that for one who has been introduced to the basic metatheorems of mathematical logic up to, say, Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, a nice introduction to the fundamental concepts and theorems of recursion theory is through the theory of satisfaction. Accordingly, this paper is directed to three audiences: (1) those familiar with recursion theory who want to see its connections to satisfaction, (2) those interested in theory of truth who want to see some of its application and methods, and (3) those, especially in philosophy, who do not have a background in recursion theory but are interested in seeing a development of some of its fundamental concepts and theorems. No familiarity with the theory of truth or satisfaction will be assumed and no knowledge of recursion theory will be assumed that goes beyond the techniques used in the proof of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. In particular, we will assume that the reader knows that "Gödel numbers" can be used to code syntactically definable features of a language and that sets and relations of Gödel numbers defining some of these features are primitive recursive. Section 2 will introduce and briefly study some logical features of a very simple language which can be interpreted so that it contains its own satisfaction predicate. In terms of this language Section 3 will introduce some of the basic concepts of recursion theory and prove some of its fundamental theorems. Of course, my treatment of recursion theory is not intended to be comprehensive; rather, the aim is to give the reader a feel for how recursion theory can be developed in terms of the theory of satisfaction. Since this paper will not assume that the reader is an expert in either of the areas of discussion, one who is will find that certain sections of the paper can simply be skimmed over. Next we must consider the conditions under which Sat can be treated as a satisfaction predicate. Two approaches might be taken. The direct approach would require the domain of the interpretation to contain the formulas of the language. The more usual approach is in terms of Gödel numberings and this is the approach we will follow. We let a Gödel numbering be a one-to-one mapping from formulas of L into N. Generally when people consider Gödel numberings it is understood that the mapping will be 'effective', but, for the time being, we will not put any such restriction on the Gödel numbering. For a fixed Gödel numbering gn, we will define 
If (S) = S, we say that S is a fixed point of , and that L(S) is a fixed point language. Let 0 (S) = S, α+1 (S) = ( α (S)), and, for limit ordinal λ, λ (S) = ∪ α<λ α (S).
With respect to a given Gödel numbering, we call a fixed point a least fixed point provided it is a subset of every fixed point, and where S is a least fixed point, we speak of L(S) as a least fixed point language. We let be the empty set. Our proof of Theorem 2.2 will rely on the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3 With respect to any Gödel numbering the following hold.
(a) Suppose S 1 ⊆ S 2 ; then for any formula A and sequence r, 
Finally, suppose that α is a limit ordinal and that d ∈ α (S). We must show that
For (d) we show by induction on ordinal δ that α (S) ⊆ α+δ (S) . (S) , and thus α (S) ⊆ α+δ+1 (S). If δ is a limit then so is α + δ, and α < α + δ.
(e) can be shown by induction on the complexity of formula A. We assume that |= ω (S) A [r] . Suppose that A is atomic. The case is clear for (c) . Suppose that S ⊆ (S). We need to show (1) ω (S) is a fixed point, (2) ω (S) is contained in every fixed point that contains S, and (3) in L( ω (S)), Sat is a satisfaction predicate. Let's begin with (2). By induction we can see that, for all n ∈ N, n (S) is contained in every fixed point containing S (if any exist): for 0 (S) = S ⊆ every fixed point containing S, and whenever n (S) ⊆ S * , where S * is a fixed point containing S, by monotonicity and the definition of a fixed point, n+1 (S) = ( n (S)) ⊆ (S * ) = S * . Since, for each n, n (S) is contained in every fixed point that contains S, ∪ n∈N n (S) = ω (S) must also be.
To show (1) we need to show that ω (S) = ω+1 (S) . By (c) of Lemma 2.3, To complete the proof of Theorem 2.2 it suffices to note that parts (a) and (b) follow from part (c) since ⊆ ( ) and ⊆ any fixed point.
It may be useful to pause and reflect on the construction of the least fixed point.
Note that for no finite n is L( n ( )) a fixed point. We can see this as follows. For any formula A with Gödel number n, let A be the numeral for n (for example, if
(that is, |= m ( ) Sat n ( 0 = 0 ) if and only if m ≥ n), and gn(Sat n ( 0 = 0 )) ∈ n+1 ( ) but / ∈ n ( ). Thus for no finite n is L( n ( )) a fixed point language.
We will say that a formula A( Sat(x 0 ) will be a truth predicate in each fixed point language.
L( ω ( )) will not be the only fixed point language. Consider the formula Sat(x 0 , x 0 ). Suppose that its Gödel number is n. Consider any interpretation S of Sat. Suppose that n, n ∈ S. Then |= S Sat(x 0 , x 0 ) [r] for any r that extends n . Thus n, n ∈ (S). In particular { n, n } ⊆ ({ n, n }), and thus, by Theorem 2.2(c), ω ({ n, n }) will be a fixed point containing n, n . On the other hand, suppose n, n / ∈ S then it is not the case that |= S Sat(x 0 , x 0 ) [r] for any r that extends n , and thus n, n / ∈ (S). By induction it can be seen that, for all α, n, n / ∈ α (S). In particular, for all α < ω, n, n / ∈ α ( ), and thus n, n / ∈ ω ( ). Thus ω ({ n, n }) and ω ( ) are distinct fixed points. As we shall see, for each Gödel numbering there are 2 ℵ 0 fixed points.
To make our terminology less cumbersome, we will abbreviate L( α (S)) as L S,α . Our primary interest will be the least fixed point language L ,ω . Rather than write |= ω ( ) A[r] we will write |=A[r], and rather than write |= ω ( ) A we will write |=A.
Given a fixed Gödel numbering for the language, the theory of the least fixed point interpretation, L ,ω admits of a rather straightforward axiomatization. We take as our sole axiom
The set of theorems is the smallest set of sentences which includes the axiom and is closed under the following rules of inference. (Read A as ' A is a theorem'. A =⇒ B means that if A is a theorem then so is B.)
Here we let n stand for the numeral for n (for example, if n = 2 then n = s(s(0))), and A(x 0 /t 0 , . . . , x m /t m ) is the formula that results from replacing all free occurrences of the variables x i with t i (for 0
A derivation is a sequence of sentences of L in which each sentence is either 0 ≈ 0 or else follows from a previous sentence (or sentences) in the sequence by one of the rules of inference. A sentence will be a theorem if and only if it occurs as the last sentence of a derivation. The set of theorems will be relative to a Gödel numbering; that is, different Gödel numberings will generally result in a different set of theorems. For any fixed Gödel numbering, our axiomatization is a sound and complete axiomatization of the least fixed point language L ,ω . Proof: By Lemma 2.3(e), if |=A then, for some finite n, |= n ( ) A. Thus it will suffice to show by induction on n that if |= n ( ) A then A. Suppose that n = 0 and |= 0 ( ) A, that is, |= A. We show by induction on the complexity of A that A. Suppose that A is atomic. A cannot be Sat(t 0 , . . . , t m ) since the extension of Sat is empty in L( ). So A is t 0 ≈ t 1 . Since A is a true sentence, t 0 and t 1 will be the same numeral. Thus t 0 ≈ t 1 will either be the axiom 0 ≈ 0 or be obtained from 0 ≈ 0 by a finite number of applications of Rule 1. The induction step, for A nonatomic, is straightforward. So now we assume that, for any sentence A, if |= n ( ) A then A, to show that, for any A, if |= n+1 ( ) A then A. We assume |= n+1 ( ) A and show by induction on the complexity of A that A. The argument is the same as for the case of n = 0 except that now we must also consider the case where A is the sentence Sat (t 0 , . . . , t m ). Suppose |= n+1 ( ) Sat(t 0 , . . . , t m ). t 0 , . . . , t m will be numerals. We may assume that they denote respectively the numbers k 0 , . . . , k m . k 0 is the Gödel number of a formula B with at most x 0 , . . . , x m−1 free such that |= n ( ) B[r] for every r that extends
, which is what we wanted to show.
Recall that so far we have put no restrictions on the way language L is to be Gödel numbered. If the Gödel numbering allows us either (1) to effectively decide for any formula A what its Gödel number is or (2) to effectively decide for any number (expressed as a numeral of L) whether it is the Gödel number of a formula and, if so, of which formula, then we will be able to effectively decide whether a sentence in a sequence follows from previous sentences by one of the rules (and in particular we will be able to decide whether it follows by Rule 6), and thus it will be effectively decidable whether a given sequence is a derivation. If, however, neither (1) nor (2) is effectively decidable we will have no effective way to determine whether one sentence follows from another by Rule 6.
It will be useful to introduce the notion of the definability of a set or relation in L(S), for arbitrary S. We say that a formula F containing at most x 0 , . . . , x i as free
For n ∈ N, we identify n with n itself and so treat a set of numbers as a one-place relation on the numbers. We identify an n-place function with an n + 1-place relation. Thus our notion of definition applies to sets and functions. Say that a condition C determines an i-place relation R provided C holds of n 1 , . . . , n i if and only if n 1 , . . . , n i ∈ R. If condition C determines an i-place relation R, then we say that a given formula defines condition C if and only if it defines the relation determined by C. A condition or relation is definable in L(S) provided that there is a formula which defines it in L(S).
Suppose that { n 1 , . . . , n i | n 1 , . . . , n i ∈ R} is any i-place relation on N and suppose that 1 ≤ j ≤ i; then the relation { n 1 , . . . , n j , . . . , n i |∀m(m < n j =⇒ n 1 , . . . , m, . . . , n i ∈ R)} is said to be obtained by bounded universal quantification on the j th term of R (here we are using n i , . . . , m, . . . , n i to stand for the result of replacing the j th term in n 1 , . . . , n j , . . . , n i with m). The following theorem will be useful. Proof: Suppose that L(S) is a fixed point language and formula A, with at most
Theorem 2.6 With respect to any Gödel numbering, for each i and for
and let 1 ≤ j ≤ i. Take the formula ( * )
(Here I am using Sat(
results from ( * ) by replacing the variable x i+1 with the numeral for the Gödel number for ( * ). BU i j (x 0 , . . . , x i−1 , A ) defines the relation obtained by bounded universal quantification on the j th term of R. To show this we need to prove that
holds if and only if
(where, again, n 1 , . . . , m, . . . , n i is used to stand for the result of replacing the j th term in n 1 , . . . , n i with m). This will be proven by induction on n j . Basis step: Suppose n j = 0. Then (2) holds trivially, and (1) holds since the first disjunct of
. . , n j , . . . , n i ] when n j = 0. Induction step: Suppose that the induction hypothesis holds for n j ≤ p.
We need to show that for n j = p + 1, (1) 
which holds, since n j = p + 1, if and only if n 1 , . . . , p, . . . , n i satisfies
which holds if and only if both (3) and (4) hold:
(We use the fact that L(S) is a fixed point to get (3) and the induction hypothesis together with the fact that L(S) is a fixed point to get (4).) (3) together with (4) in turn holds if and only if (2) holds since n j = p + 1.
Corollary 2.7 The conditions which determine definable i-place relations in any given fixed point are closed under bounded universal quantification.
3 Recursion theory We now study recursion theory in terms of our fixed point languages, especially L ,ω . We begin by looking at the partial recursive functions. Here we speak of a partial function if the domain and range are subsets of N; a partial function whose domain is the whole of N will be called a total function or simply a function. The set of partial recursive functions includes the following basic functions defined on N:
1. the zero function , z(n): for all n, z(n) = 0; 2. the successor function, : for all n, n = n + 1; 3. the identity functions, 5. primitive recursion: suppose that f is an i-place partial function and g is an i + 2-place partial function; then we define the i + 1-place partial function h by primitive recursion on f and g as follows:
6. minimization: suppose that f i+1 is an i + 1-place partial function; then we say that the i-place partial function g is the minimization of f provided that
and g(n 1 , . . . , n i ) is undefined if no such m exists. We will write g(n 1 , . . . , n i )
A recursive function is a partial recursive function that is a total function. The partial functions that can be defined in terms of the three basic functions together with composition and primitive recursion but without minimization will be a sub 
.) Any recursive relation R will be r.e., for R = { n 1 , . . . , n i | f (n 1 , . . . , n i ) = 0}, for some recursive characteristic function f , and thus R is the domain of the partial recursive function
The intuitive ideas these formal notions are intended to capture are roughly as follows. Say that an i-place relation R on N has an effective decision procedure if and only if there is an algorithm such that, given any i-tuple n 1 , . . . , n i of numbers (in some standard notation, for example, decimal notation), eventually the procedure will give an answer stating whether or not n 1 , . . . , n i ∈ R. The notion of a recursive relation is widely thought to capture the idea of an effectively decidable relation on N. The notion of an r.e. relation is supposed to capture the weaker notion of a relation for which there is a positive algorithmic test which will eventually produce an affirmative answer if and only if n 1 , . . . , n i ∈ R (but may not produce any output if n 1 , . . . , n i / ∈ R). The notion of a partial recursive function is intended to capture the idea of a partial function, f i , for which there exists an algorithmic procedure such that, given an input n 1 , . . . , n i , the procedure will yield a resulting value, m, if and only if If f (n 1 , . . . , n i ) is undefined then the algorithm yields no value (and the algorithmic procedure might not even terminate). Recursive functions cover the special case where for each input n 1 , . . . , n i the procedure yields a value. We will not discuss the issue of whether recursion theory succeeds in providing an adequate formalization of these ideas. ( Sat(x j+1 , x 0 
i+1 ), then the i-place partial function which is the minimization on f i+1 is defined by the formula Mn i (x 0 , . . . , x i , F ).

Proof: Part (a) follows from parts (b) and (c). Part (b): Take any interpretation
L(S). The zero function is the relation
Next consider partial functions defined by primitive recursion. For simplicity, suppose that the partial function h(n 0 , n 1 ) = m is defined by primitive recursion from the partial functions f (n 0 ) = m and g(n 0 , n 1 , n 2 ) = m. (Our considerations can be easily generalized to cover cases where h is not a two-placed partial function.) Suppose that the formulas F(x 0 , x 1 ) and G(x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) define f and g, respectively. We need to show that there is a formula which defines h. Consider the following formula,
Suppose that the Gödel number of this formula is k. The following formula, 
Suppose n 1 = 0. Then this formula will be satisfied by n 0 , n 1 , m if and only if the first disjunct is so satisfied, if and only if f (n 0 ) = m, if and only if h(n 0 , n 1 ) = m. Suppose that n 1 = i . Then the formula will be satisfied by n 0 , n 1 , m if and only if the second disjunct is so satisfied. Note that the second disjunct is the formula,
and thus, by the induction hypothesis, it will be satisfied by n 0 , n 1 , m (that is,
, which is what we wanted to prove. Finally we turn to minimization. Suppose that the partial function f i+1 (n 0 , . . . , n i ) = n i+1 is defined by formula F(x 0 , . . . , x i+1 ) and the partial function g is the minimization of f . We want to find a formula that defines g. g(n 0 , . . . , n i−1 ) = n i if and only if the following condition is met:
from Theorem 2.6) we may let Mn i (x 0 ,. . ., x i+1 ) be the formula
Then Mn i (x 0 , . . . , x i , F ) will then be the formula
which defines condition ( * ), completing the proof.
Corollary 3.2 With respect to any Gödel numbering, in every fixed point, every set or relation that is r.e. (and thus any set or relation that is recursive) is definable.
Proof: Take any i-place r.e. relation R. It is the domain of an i-place partial recursive function, which is definable by some formula A(x 0 , . . . , x i ). R is defined by the formula ∃x i A(x 0 , . . . , x i ).
Let's illustrate how we can construct formulas of L that define partial recursive functions in any fixed point. Take the primitive recursive function n 0 + n 1 = n 2 . We may define this function by primitive recursion from appropriate functions f and g as follows:
f is the function id 1 1 . g(n 0 , n 1 , n 2 ) = n 3 is the function formed by composition of the successor function with id 3 3 . Let Sum(x 0 ,
2 ) defines the relation { n 0 , n 1 , n 2 |n 0 + n 1 = n 2 } in every fixed point language. Readers not familiar with this technique might want to try as exercises constructing formulas Prod(x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) and exp(x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) to respectively define the functions n 0 · n 1 = n 2 and n n 1 0 = n 2 . (Note that the product and exponentiation functions are primitive recursive:
.3 There are enumerably many partial recursive functions, recursive functions, recursively enumerable relations, and recursive relations.
Proof: Since all recursive functions are partial recursive functions and all recursive relations are r.e. relations it will suffice to show that there are at most enumerably many partial recursive functions and r.e. relations. That there are enumerably many partial recursive functions (and thus enumerably many r.e. relations) follows from the fact that (in any given fixed point) each partial recursive function can be defined by a formula and there are only enumerably many formulas of L.
Theorem 3.4 There are functions that are not partial recursive functions and relations that are not r.e.
Proof: This follows from the previous theorem since there are nondenumerably many functions and relations on N.
We have seen that in any fixed point language all r.e. relations are definable. One might wonder whether only r.e. relations are definable in the fixed point languages, or, at least, whether only r.e. relations are definable in the least fixed point languages for any given Gödel numbering. The following theorems will answer these questions. 
Proof:
(a) Suppose that we have a fixed Gödel numbering. Consider the formula Sat(x 0 , x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x i ). Suppose its Gödel number is n 0 . Then for any S and any α, n 0 , n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n i ∈ α (S) if and only if n 0 , n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n i ∈ S. This can be shown by induction on α. For α = 0, this holds since 0 (S) = S. If it holds for α, then n 0 , n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n i ∈ S if and only if n 0 , n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n i ∈ α (S) if and only if (S) , and thus by the induction hypothesis, n 0 , n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n i ∈ S. Consider any i-place relation, R, on N. Let R * = { n 0 , n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n i | n 1 , . . . , n i ∈ R}. By the above considerations R * ⊆ (R * ). Thus, by Theorem 2.2(c), 
Theorem 3.6 For any relation R, there exists a Gödel numbering for which R can be defined in the least fixed point language for that Gödel numbering.
Proof: Let R be any i-place relation on N. R is enumerable. Let n 0,1 ,n 0,2 , . . . ,n 0,i , n 1,1 , n 1,2 , . . . , n 1,i , n 2,1 , n 2,2 , . . . , n 2,i , . . . be a nonredundant enumeration of the elements of R. (This enumeration need not be effective; recall that we are not requiring our Gödel numberings to be effective.)
Case 1: The enumeration is finite. In this case R can be defined under any Gödel numbering. If R is empty, 0 = 1 defines R. Suppose R is nonempty but finite. Let its enumeration be n 0, 1 , n 0,2 , . . . , n 0,i , . . . , n k,1 , n k,2 , . . . , n k,i . Then the formula
Case 2: The enumeration of R is infinite. For each m ∈ N, we let 2m be the Gödel number of the formula
(Here 2m + 2 is the numeral for the number 2m + 2.) To all the other formulas assign odd Gödel numbers.
, and so on. In the least fixed point language L ,ω , the
Taking for R a relation that is not r.e., Theorem 3.6 shows the following. We see that part of the strength (measured in terms of power to define relations) of a least fixed point language may be determined by the Gödel numbering, but each fixed point has at least the strength to define all r.e. relations. We have put no restrictions on allowable Gödel numberings. Normally in setting out a particular Gödel numbering care is taken so that the numbering is effective: one can effectively go from an expression (say a sentence or formula) set out in appropriate notation to its Gödel number (expressed in appropriate notation), and one can effectively decide for a number (expressed in appropriate notation) whether it is the Gödel number for an expression and if so which expression (expressed in appropriate notation). I do not want the development of our theory to depend on the general notion of an effective Gödel numbering. On the other hand, I do not want to take the space to carefully set out a particular Gödel numbering. So I will merely make a few remarks about well-known features of the Gödel numbering of languages.
Using standard techniques, a Gödel numbering gn * can be set out that has the following properties: (1) Not only are Gödel numbers assigned to formulas but they are also assigned to finite sequences of formulas, in particular a derivation will have a Gödel number; (2) The following functions, Sub i (n 1 , n 2 ) and Proof(n 1 , n 2 ), are primitive recursive. For each i, Sub i (n 1 , n 2 ) = n 1 if n 1 is not a Gödel number for a well-formed formula; if n 1 = gn * ( A) for some well-formed formula A then Sub i (n 1 , n 2 ) = gn * ( A(x i /n 2 )). Proof(n 1 , n 2 ) = 0 if n 2 is the Gödel number for a derivation and n 1 is the Gödel number for the last sentence of the derivation; otherwise Proof(n 1 , n 2 ) = 1. Let
) is primitive recursive since it can be obtained from the Sub i functions (along with the id functions) using composition.
Let L * be the least fixed point language under Gödel numbering gn * . 
Note that g is primitive recursive (this relies on the fact we saw earlier that multiplication is primitive recursive). 
Here we may take 'gn * ( A)' to stand in for the i + 1-place constant function whose value is gn * ( A); this function is primitive recursive since it can be defined as (z(id i 1 (n 0 , . . . , n i ))) ... (where the number of applications of the successor function = gn * ( A)). The function, µk [Proof(Sub 0, ..., i 
is thus a partial recursive function with arguments n 0 , . . . , n i−1 , built up from the zero function, the identity functions, and the successor function using composition, primitive recursion, and minimization. Thus f is a partial recursive function. 
total function which is the characteristic function, c R , for R. c R is thus a recursive function and so R is recursive. (c) By part (b), R 1 is recursive ⇐⇒ R 1 and R 1 are r.e. ⇐⇒ R 1 and R 1 are r.e.
⇐⇒ R 1 is recursive. Suppose that R 1 and R 2 are i-place recursive relations. By part (b), R 1 , R 1 , R 2 , and R 2 are r.e. By part (a), R 1 ∪ R 2 and (R 1 ∪ R 2 ) (= R 1 ∩ R 2 ) are r.e. Thus, by (b), R 1 ∪ R 2 is recursive. The proof for R 1 ∩ R 2 is similar.
Let us return to some ideas developed in the proof of Theorem 3.8. Consider the recursive function obtained from (5) just is the partial function f . If e 0 is not the gn * of a formula with at most x 0 , . . . , x i free, then enum i (e 0 , n 0 , . . . , n i−1 ) is the i-place partial function which is totally undefined (that is, its range = ). Suppose that e 0 = gn * ( A) for some formula A which defines in L * an i + 1-place relation R which is not a partial function (that is, for some n and some m = n, both n 0 , . . . , n i−1 , n and n 0 , . . . , n i−1 , m ∈ R), then enum i (e 0 , n 0 , . . . , n i−1 ) defines an i-place partial function whose graph is a subset of R. The value of enum i (e 0 , n 0 , . . . , n i−1 ) may be described as follows: take the smallest number m for which m is the Gödel number of a derivation whose last sentence is of the form A(n 0 , . . . , n i−1 , k) where k ≤ m; then enum i (e 0 , n 0 , . . . , n i−1 ) = k Comment on Theorem 3.11: A stronger version of Theorem 3.11 could have been derived if we had given a more fully developed treatment of the primitive recursive functions. It can be shown that there are primitive recursive functions P 2 , L 1 , and R 1 such that whenever P(n 0 , n 1 ) = n 2 , then the following hold: L(n 2 ) = n 0 , R(n 2 ) = n 1 . 
Rather than define enum
